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Abstract: The recent IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5 ◦C emphasizes that rapid action
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is vital to achieving the climate mitigation goals of the
Paris Agreement. The most-needed substantial upscaling of investments in GHG mitigation options
in all sectors, and particularly in manufacturing sectors, can be an opportunity for a green economic
development leap in developing countries. Here, we use the Brazilian manufacturing sectors as an
example to explore a transformation of its economy while contributing to the Paris targets. Projections
of Brazil’s economic futures with and without a portfolio of fiscal policies to induce low carbon
investments are produced up to 2030 (end year of Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution—NDC),
by employing the large-scale macro econometric Energy-Environment-Economy Model, E3ME. Our
findings highlight that the correct mix of green stimulus can help modernize and decarbonize the
Brazilian manufacturing sectors and allow the country’s economy to grow faster (by up to 0.42%
compared to baseline) while its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions decline (by up to 14.5% in relation to
baseline). Investment levels increase, thereby strengthening exports’ competitiveness and alleviating
external constraints to long-term economic growth in net terms.
Keywords: climate change macroeconomics; fiscal policy; sustainable economic development
1. Introduction
The twin challenge of pursuing socioeconomic development while reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to the levels needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s [1] temperature goals in developing
countries is often recognized. However, much of the literature focuses on mitigation policies that
are estimated to lead to net economic losses. For example, the IPCC AR5 [2] reports that reaching to
levels of atmospheric GHG concentrations that are consistent with warming below 2 ◦C relative to
pre-industrial levels, results in net macroeconomic losses that range between 2% and 15% of global
GDP in relation to a baseline without mitigation (the IPCC SR1.5 [3] did not assess macroeconomic
costs of reducing global GHG emissions to the level required to achieve 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C pathways).
These existing estimates of net macroeconomic costs of mitigation can lead to the misleading perception
that economies perform better when no explicit action to reduce GHG emissions is taken and that
mitigation policies are necessarily costly in macroeconomic terms. This body of literature has been
recently criticized for underestimating both the costs of unmanaged climate change (e.g., catastrophic
changes) and the benefits of the global low carbon transition (such as the spillover effects of green
innovation and economies of scale; [4–8]).
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We aim to identify policies to spur mitigation that can not only reduce GHG emissions but also
deliver socioeconomic gains by using the example of the Brazilian manufacturing sectors. Brazil
represents a typical case of an emerging economy that has achieved significant economic and social
progress at the cost of increasing fossil fuel burning. In less than 10 years, Brazil has more than doubled
its share of the global GDP, from 1.4% in 2003 to 3.3% in 2012 [9]. In the same period, Brazil’s CO2
emissions from fossil fuel burning have grown at a rate of 3.7% per year on average, above the world
average of 3.4% [9]. Recently, Brazil’s economic performance declined severely. In 2015 Brazil’s real
GDP fell by 3.8% [10], and over 2.5 million jobs were lost [9], and the exact reasons for that decline
are still debated but are most likely due to fears of economic instability (see [11] for a review). Since
then, Brazil’s economy has plateaued with, in 2018, real GDP growth rate at 1.12% and unemployment
rate at 11.6% [10]. Along with other developing economies, Brazil faces the challenge of recovering
economic growth to address its sizeable socioeconomic issues in the current global context where
reducing GHG emissions is critical to the achieve climate mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement [1].
Brazil voluntarily pledged to reduce its economy-wide GHG emissions by 37% by 2025 and,
indicatively, 43% by 2030 in relation to 2005 [12]. Compared to other major developing countries, Brazil
was the only emerging economy to commit to an absolute target compared to a baseline year [13].
However, most (41%) of the emissions cuts in Brazil already occurred between 2005 and 2012, owing
to reduced deforestation (ibid.). Recent research [14] shows that it is feasible for Brazil to continue
reducing deforestation without compromising agricultural output because the country has enough
cleared areas to meet the increase in future demand for agricultural products while sparing land for
conservation. Meanwhile, manufacturing sectors share in Brazil’s net CO2 emissions escalated from
5.9% in 2005 to 20.2% in 2010 [15]. The uptake of low carbon technologies in these sectors is pivotal to
avoid increasing the country’s GHG emissions in the future. Manufacturing sectors are the focus of
this study also because of their potential to address environmental issues (e.g., producing capital goods
that use less energy) and their general applicability (i.e., technologies can be used by other sectors,
such as solar panels that can be used in agriculture).
In Brazil, the economic literature on climate change has also estimated net economic losses.
In 2010, a report [16] projected that a carbon tax at USD 30/tCO2e and USD 50/tCO2e would reduce the
country’s GHG emissions by 1.16% and 1.87%, respectively. Despite revenues being recycled back to
the economy via a subsidy to reduce prices, a negative impact on GDP ranging between 0.13% and
0.08% was found. Recently, another report [17] projected that the introduction of a carbon tax (where
revenues were used to reduce labor taxes) at USD 20/tCO2e and USD 100/tCO2e would reduce Brazil’s
GDP by 0.17% and 1.48% and GHG emissions by 21.4% and 38.1%, respectively, by 2030.
Studies that explicitly model and quantify the potential for low carbon investments to become
a driver of economic development in developing countries are sparse, and no such studies were
identified for Brazil. There are studies, for example, that estimated the impacts of investments in
key areas for the green economy on GDP, employment, GHG emissions, etc., for South Africa [18],
Kenya [19], China [20], Uruguay [21], and Mozambique [22]. Notwithstanding, in all these simulations,
green investments are direct and exogenous and do not occur in response to any explicit public policies
and measures aimed at inducing low carbon investments.
In this paper, an assessment is made of the impacts of introducing a portfolio of green fiscal
policies to foster low carbon investments in Brazil, which include fiscal incentives (tax deductions and
concessional finance) for investments in modern low carbon technologies by manufacturing sectors
and in planted forests (such that all manufacturing sector’s demand for forest products is sustainable)
and an economy-wide carbon tax. The methods employed are presented in Section 2. The results are
discussed and analyzed in Section 3. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. Materials and Methods
This paper presents a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic and environmental impacts
of a green shift in Brazil driven by a portfolio of fiscal policies to induce low carbon investments
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by manufacturing industries. Green fiscal policies are effective instruments to induce the uptake of
green technologies in Brazil [23], and they can help overcome economic barriers for adopting cleaner
production technologies [24]. These policies also have the potential to deliver multiple socioeconomic
dividends when properly designed, such as reduced tax distortions, increased demand and investment
levels, and sound fiscal policy [25–31].
Scenarios are built with the aim of assessing whether the introduction of a portfolio of fiscal
policies that induce uptake of low carbon technologies by manufacturing sectors would be consistent
with a more virtuous economic development cycle in Brazil, in addition to a business as usual (BAU)
reference scenario that represents the counterpoint to an alternative, greener development path. It is
assumed that green fiscal reforms (GFRs) are implemented to trigger, shape, and catalyze a greener
development path in Brazil.
In the BAU scenario, Brazil follows a typical fossil fuel-intensive development path. The BAU
policy assumptions are based on the IEA World Energy Outlook 2014 Current Policies Scenario [32],
which includes public policies and measures that had been formally adopted as of mid-2014. We
built eleven policy scenarios that implement various GFRs and combinations of these to capture the
impacts of Brazil actively pursuing an alternative development path that aims to reconcile economic
growth and climate change mitigation. The main difference in relation to the BAU scenario is that
Brazil introduces tax exemptions and concessional finance for low carbon investments to induce the
uptake of modern low carbon technologies by manufacturing industries, and an economy-wide carbon
tax. The GFR starts in the year 2018 and runs up to 2030, which is consistent with the timeframe of
Brazil’s NDC.
GFR is defined to be the reduction of distorting taxes on investments and the provision of
concessional financing for investments in low carbon technologies by manufacturing industries. The
tax exemption is assumed to be the reduction of distorting taxes on green investments that increase their
costs. Brazil has a high tax burden on investments in comparison to both developed and developing
countries [33]. This type of fiscal incentive can help unlock private climate finance because the bulk
of the additional green investment prompted by the fiscal incentive is paid for by the private sector
(although the public sector sponsors the cost reduction, i.e., the foregone revenues from tax exemptions).
This kind of fiscal incentive, by helping to bring private finance in, can be a cost-efficient way to
induce decarbonization in a context of constrained fiscal space, as Brazil’s public spending has been
frozen for the next 20 years (Emenda Constitucional 95/2016, known as “expenditure ceiling” (Teto
dos Gastos)). In the Brazilian manufacturing sector, total tax costs amount to nearly one quarter (i.e.,
24.3%) of investments [34]. In the GFR scenarios, it is assumed that tax amendments are introduced
that reduce the distorting tax burden on green investments by up to 11.3 percentage points (i.e., from
24.3% to 13%; ibid.). The 11.3 percentage points parameter represents a feasible and realistic level of
tax reduction on investments made by manufacturing sectors in Brazil, following a study [34] that
quantified the amount of tax burden on investments that can be reduced in these sectors in the country
(see Supplementary Methods for detailed discussion of tax amendments corresponding to this level of
tax relief). Tax reliefs are applied to green investments only, a measure which is aimed at creating an
incentive for investment in green technologies over polluting technologies. Brown (i.e., non-green)
investments are taxed as per standard tax rates (i.e., there are no tax exemptions for these).
Investments, particularly in manufacturing sectors, are key for long-term economic growth
as they allow for demand to expand without inflation pressures (i.e., by expanding capacity),
modernize the productive structure, foster innovation (e.g., through cumulated learning), and improve
productivity [35–37]. Fiscal stimulus boosts investments, which in turn, as an important component of
demand, can increase output and employment both in the short- and in the long-term [38]. Taxing
investments thus creates distortions that hamper long-term economic growth. Taxation of green
investments, in addition to these distortions, also hinders the uptake of low carbon technologies that
deliver environmental benefits.
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In addition to reducing distortive taxes on green investments, the GFR also comprehends the
provision of concessional finance for investments in green technologies to further support the uptake
of low carbon technologies. It is assumed that public funding is provided in the form of grants (i.e.,
non-reimbursable finance) for businesses to adopt low carbon technologies. Whereas tax exemptions
reduce the cost of investments in green technologies, the provision of public funding reduces both
costs and risks associated with these technologies [39,40]. Providing public funding helps the business
sector engage in innovation and investment projects in which they would otherwise not take part
because of their relatively high risks. These are risks involved in the transitional phase, in which
industries are learning how to use the new technology, such as financial risks of high upfront capital
costs (of solar panels, for instance, which may take years before pay-back is reached) and risks related
to technological learning, for example, production disruptions, adapting to new inputs, and issues
(such as a lack of skilled workers) involved in deploying green technologies on a large-scale [39,41].
Concessional finance is provided early in the investment cycle to support industries to unlock the
necessary investments to kick-start the transition by reducing upfront capital costs and mitigate risks
associated with technological learning. In addition, by overcoming inertia and carbon lock-in, it helps
catalyze further private investment [42]. Brown investments must be financed by funding regularly
provided by financial markets in the economy (i.e., there is no additional public funding for these).
It is further assumed that the additional government spending—due to foregone tax revenues
owing to tax exemptions and increased expenditure on funding of green investments—is financed by
introducing an economy-wide carbon tax. The carbon tax rate is established at a level that at least
compensates for the negative impact on the government budget balance at any point in time. The carbon
tax rate is fixed and does not vary over time, which helps create a stable and credible environment for
investments in low carbon technologies [42–45]. Furthermore, the government would be adopting
a precautionary policy by seeking to protect its finances against unexpected shocks in the economy.
All fossil fuels are taxed to raise revenues but also to incentivize low carbon investments in the entire
economy. All users of fossil fuels in the economy are taxed except households, to avoid placing a
direct burden on families that could create regressivity that would widen social inequality in Brazil,
following Dercon (2012) [46]. Because energy is an essential good, low-income households are likely to
spend a larger proportion of their income on it in relation to high-income households [47]. Therefore, a
regressive impact of taxing fossil fuels could be obtained if household consumption was included in
the carbon tax. Another way by which equity concerns are addressed in the GFR is by recycling the
carbon tax revenues back into the economy by introducing incentives for green investments, which
should increase wages by diffusing modern low carbon technologies that increase productivity.
In summary, these GFRs shift the tax burden to carbon intensive technologies, owing to the carbon
tax on fossil fuels, and reduce the cost of low carbon technologies in manufacturing sectors due to
fiscal incentives for green investments, thereby driving technology to the right direction [29]. The
implementation of multiple climate-aligned fiscal instruments (carbon tax, tax reliefs, and concessional
financing) contribute to build an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty and fosters
credibility for low carbon investments, because they make expectations robust to a change in any one
of the individual policies, help signal the market, and build societal trust towards the low-carbon
transition [29,42,48].
The investments that are eligible for tax exemptions and public financing consist of investments in
modern low carbon technologies (Table 1) that deliver the maximum mitigation potential (World Bank,
2010) by Brazilian manufacturing sectors, namely: energy efficiency (EE); materials saving and recycling
(MR); switching from more carbon-intensive fossil fuels to natural gas (NG); renewables—biomass and
solar (RN); shifting from non-renewable to sustainable biomass (SB); and cogeneration (CO). These
technologies present a sufficient degree of technological maturity (i.e., technologies available at the
commercial stage) and availability for large-scale implementation by 2030 (ibid.).
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6783 5 of 16
Table 1. Low carbon technologies.
Technologies Description
Energy efficiency (EE)
Technologies that use less energy from fossil fuels to produce the same
products, including combustion optimization, heat recovery systems, steam
recovery systems, furnace heat recovery systems, new industrial processes.
Materials saving and
recycling (MR)
Technologies that substitute virgin inputs with recycled inputs and improve
the production process by reducing losses and/or using fewer inputs.
Natural gas (NG) Technologies that allow substituting fossil fuels (namely fuel oil, coke, andcoal) with natural gas, which is a less carbon-intensive fossil fuel.
Renewables (biomass and
solar) (RN)
Technologies that substitute fossil fuels with two types of renewable energy:
biomass (firewood and charcoal) and solar-thermal (i.e., complementary
water heating systems).
Sustainable firewood and
charcoal (SB)
This technology concerns phasing-out non-renewable firewood and charcoal
(i.e., from wood extracted from native forests) and displacing it with
sustainable firewood and charcoal (i.e., wood obtained from planted forests).
Cogeneration (CO)
Combined production of thermal and electric energy in the same system (i.e.,
combined heat and power) technologies. These include mechanical
equipment fuelled by heat, whose waste heat is used to produce electricity
(i.e., heat as the main output and electricity as a by-product).
Source: World Bank (2010) [49].
GFR scenarios are built to target investments in each type of technology, both separately and
jointly (Table 2). The scenarios energy efficiency (EE), materials saving and recycling (MR), natural gas
(NG), renewables (biomass and solar) (RN), sustainable biomass (SB), and cogeneration (CO), are each
separately built to simulate the introduction of “mini” GFRs targeted at specific green investments.
These scenarios aim at testing the impact of “mini” fiscal reforms targeted at each type of green
investment separately. Scenarios are incrementally built such that each of them progressively induces
the uptake of one more type of technology, such that their joint implementation is also considered.
In each scenario, the portfolio of tax exemptions, concessional finance, and carbon tax is designed to
address the specificities of the mitigation technology in question in terms of investment costs and
cycle and technological penetration potential for each economic sector (see Table 2 and Supplementary
Methods for details). For example, in the EE scenario, the amount of tax that is exempted from payment
and the volume of concessional funding provided are specifically designed to induce investments in
energy efficiency in each sector. Based on clearly defined rules, the GFRs are both transparent and
flexible by considering various sector specificities and distributional effects between economic sectors,
which are key features of a credible policy to foster low carbon investments [43].
Table 2. Summary of scenarios.
Scenarios Overview
EE: energy efficiency
MR: materials savings and recycling
NG: natural gas
RN: renewables
SB: sustainable biomass
CO: cogeneration
Each scenario simulates “mini” GFRs targeted at
investments in one type of green technology.
Industries invest in one type of low carbon
technology only.
EE+MR
EE+MR+NG
EE+MR+NG+RN
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO
Each scenario progressively includes additional
technologies as part of investments to be targeted by
GFRs.
Industries invest in multiple low carbon technologies
simultaneously.
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Regarding the rest of the world, it is assumed that no additional action to address climate change
is taken in other countries, similar to the reference scenario, based on the IEA World Energy Outlook
2014 Current Policies Scenario [32] that assumes that the current climate policies in place will continue.
These scenarios explore GFR as a national development strategy that is not conditional on countries
taking further actions to mitigate climate change.
Scenarios SB, EE+MR+NG+RN+SB, and EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO include investments in
sustainable biomass (SB). For this technology, which concerns substituting unsustainable biomass from
deforestation of native areas by SB from planted forests, it was assumed that investments are fully
induced by the provision of grants, which are, exceptionally, compensated by financial support from
the international community (and not from a carbon tax). In these scenarios, developed countries
reward Brazil for reducing emissions from deforestation, which is similar to the UNFCCC REDD+
mechanism [50]. This assumption is based on Brazil’s NDC, which reports that the implementation of
REDD+ activities in Brazil is dependent upon international support [12]. It is also based on evidence
that REDD+ can be an instrument not only to help avoid deforestation but also to produce positive
developmental impacts [51,52].
The scenarios are modeled in E3ME, which stands for Energy-Environment-Economy (E3)
Macro-Econometric model. E3ME is a macro econometric simulation model of the global (E3) systems
and includes Brazil explicitly as one of its 53 regions in version 6.0 that is used in the present study [53].
The theoretical foundation of E3ME is based on an approach explicitly focused on institutional behavior,
expectations, and uncertainty [30,53–56]. In E3ME, the economy is demand-driven so that supply
is adjusted (subject to some constraints) to meet demand levels, but not necessarily at maximum
capacity levels. Supply constraints in E3ME include the availability of labor, an implicit measure
of capacity (i.e., an estimate of normal output) such that any increase in demand beyond capacity
increases prices and import substitution thereby forcing economic activity down and econometric
parameters derived from historical data that incorporate constraints, such as past regulations that limit
debt and finance available to expand investment. In E3ME, the levels of demand determine output,
which determine employment levels allowing for varying returns to scale across sectors and over time.
The energy module in E3ME is eminently top-down with a bottom-up sub-model of the electricity
supply sector. Feedbacks from the energy module to the economy are made via input-output industry
interactions, household energy balances, and prices. The environment module in E3ME is represented
by air pollution generated from the end-use of different fuels and from the primary use of fuels in
the energy industries themselves. Interactions between the three modules are solved by using the
IDIOM software, which provides forecasts by solving a system of stochastic equations (estimated by
employing co-integration and error correction model) and accounting identities.
Compared to standard equilibrium models, E3ME differs mainly with regard to the academic
tradition and modeling approach. Standard equilibrium models are grounded on Neoclassical
Economics (NCE), which present a supply-led approach to the economy via the interaction of
consumers and firms in the market. Under standard NCE assumptions, such as perfect competition,
constant returns to scale, rational behavior, and perfect foresight, an optimal economic equilibrium
is reached, in which demand equals supply for every commodity (markets clear) and all resources
(including labor) are fully employed in the long-term [30,56,57]. The implication is that, if an optimal
equilibrium is obtained in the baseline scenario, a shock (including the introduction of climate policies)
will lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium in which economic levels are worse off. In the latest IPCC
Assessment Report, thirty out of the thirty-one models employed in the report are equilibrium models,
and all mitigation costs reported are positive and increase with the stringency of the mitigation
target [2].
The treatment of money and the financial sector is also an aspect whereby E3ME differs from
standard equilibrium models owing to different theoretical foundations. Although there is an explicit
treatment for nominal variables (wages, costs, and prices) and for carbon pricing in E3ME, the core of
the model is built on real economy dynamics. The money supply is implicitly made endogenous in the
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model since financial institutions (e.g., banks) can create money through new loans (up to the levels
allowed by past regulations that are embodied in the model’s econometric parameters) to address
new investments [58]. As a result, there is no full crowding out of investments in E3ME, which is
consistent with its theoretical foundation. In standard equilibrium models, in contrast, the money
supply is exogenous, and there is full crowding out of investments because new investments must be
financed either by increased savings that reduce consumption or by reducing investment elsewhere.
Notwithstanding, the different ways through which green investments can be financed in E3 models
are insufficiently explored, and so far, there are scarce models that present explicit treatment of money
and the financial sector [58–61].
The data sources, methodology, and modeling techniques employed were carefully selected to
make the analysis as robust as possible. Notwithstanding, as with any quantitative assessments that
involve human and physical systems and their interactions, there are limitations. First, the results
obtained rely on the availability and quality of the data. The use of multiple databases in E3ME, as in
any large-scale model, may contain imprecisions despite extensive data processing to ensure these are
consistent with each other, economic theory, and econometric practice. Second, any study that involves
making projections of the future involves uncertainties. Owing to its intrinsically unpredictable nature,
it is not possible to perfectly represent uncertainties in modeling. Uncertainties regarding key linkages
from climate change damage and ecological limits to the economy also prevented accounting for
these in the modeling exercise. Third, the treatment of elasticities in the model is based on adaptive
expectations, i.e., based on learning and information about the past. Although elasticities may change
in the future, this approach is reasonable in the presence of uncertainties, which are virtually always
present in the analysis of long timeframes [62]. Finally, the analysis of possible labor frictions, due to
reskilling or upskilling needs to operate low carbon technologies, is prevented due to data availability,
even though historical frictions are captured in the estimated coefficients for the labor market in
the model.
See Supplementary Methods for further details on the E3ME model, scenario building,
and modeling.
3. Results
In the absence of mitigation measures and policies, Brazil’s future is characterized by a carbon
intensive development path, led by increased fossil fuel consumption mainly driven by manufacturing
sectors. A similar finding was obtained by other studies [17,63] for Brazil. Despite relevant
socioeconomic improvements, such as a 40.2% increase in real GDP per capita in 2030 relative
to 2018, the baseline scenario shows that Brazil reproduces the typical structural features of developing
economies that aggravate external constraints to long-term economic growth. In the BAU scenario,
Brazil scarcely diversifies its exports, which maintain their primary and natural-resource-intensive
character, and critically relies on external markets to obtain high-technology goods and to sustain its
increased dependence on fossil fuels.
External constraints to long-term economic growth are related to insufficient productive
modernization, such that exports specialize in low added-value products (i.e., primary goods and
natural resources intensive manufactures), and more technologically elaborated goods and services,
which are necessary for industrial development, must be obtained from the external market via
imports [64–66]. External specialization in the early stages of development (i.e., exports almost
solely concentrated in primary goods and almost complete absence of industrial goods) implied that
industrialization, on the one hand, started in technologically less elaborated sectors and, on the other
hand, advanced very slowly in consumer and intermediary goods that required higher technological
and organizational complexity [67]. This pattern of economic development, which is typical of
developing countries, necessarily proceeded from simple to complex sectors and technologies, such
that the productive structure reached repeatedly incipient degrees of intersectoral complementarity
and vertical integration in relation to modern economies [67]. In the long-term, exports tend to
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increase less than imports, because of the latter’s relatively higher income-elasticity, thereby creating
external constraints that force demand levels down. Put differently, the growth prospects of developing
countries are externally limited compared to modern economies, whose technology-intensive products
tend to grow faster in trade owing to higher income elasticity and potential to create new demand and to
replace faster old products [66]. As a result, supply often operates under-full capacity, investments are
discouraged, and innovation efforts are decelerated. These structural characteristics tend to reproduce
themselves, as the specialization of exports on relatively simpler products (e.g., commodities) present
limited learning potential, fewer spillover effects in the economic chain, and vulnerability to easy entry
by low wage competitors (ibid.). Such development pattern hinders diversification and technological
improvement (i.e., competitiveness) of exports, which tend to maintain their primary character,
and sustains dependency on external markets to obtain high technology goods and services (i.e.,
high-income elasticity of demand for imports).
The analytical framework of external constraints to economic growth is supported by empirical
evidence from both developed countries [68,69] and developing countries [70,71]. Brazil has also
been studied as an example of these constraints. By presenting insufficient productive modernization
(marked by historically low levels of investment and Research and Development (R&D) expenditure),
external constraints in the absolute form (declining or lack of available foreign currency for imports)
and in the relative form (imports capacity growing slower than output) have repeatedly been an
obstacle to the country’s economic development [70,72,73]. Although the Brazilian economy has
changed significantly in recent decades, it has been reproducing the structural characteristics that
aggravate external restriction to long-term economic growth, such as an increased reliance on natural
resource intensive exports and on imports of technologically intensive goods [72,74].
The BAU scenario results indicate that Brazil tends to follow a development path that is
unsustainable economically because it reproduces structural characteristics that externally constrain
long term economic growth. This path is also environmentally unsustainable as CO2 emissions increase
along with fossil fuel dependence, following a trend that is incompatible with global efforts to limit
warming to well below 2 ◦C, as established in the Paris Agreement [1]. Changes in oil prices can impact
the results, which can be assessed by future studies (see Supplementary Materials for fossil fuel price
assumptions).
Results show that GFRs bring substantial socioeconomic and environmental gains to Brazil
compared to BAU (Figure 1). Different GFRs produce different socioeconomic and environmental
impacts, which are attributable to various combinations of tax exemptions, concessional finance,
and carbon taxation and to the technological changes produced by green investments. As GFRs are
designed to increase investment levels, while steering the new investment cycle toward low carbon
technologies, investments grow faster in response to green fiscal incentives.
Most of the increase in investment levels is concentrated in the early years of GFRs, following
the provision of concessional finance in those years to help industries overcome inertia and kick-start
the technological transition (Figure 1). The trade balance is improved in most GFR scenarios, led
by reduced dependence of fossil fuel imports and increased competitiveness of exports. Reducing
imports of fossil fuels that can be highly price-volatile and subject to supply disruptions [75] helps
Brazil mitigate its external vulnerability. Moreover, GFRs enhance Brazilian exports of medium
and high-technology manufacture because the economy becomes more capital-intensive, thereby
accumulating productive and technological competencies that increase the competitiveness of more
technologically complex products. As a result, the country’s exports become less concentrated on
primary products and natural-resource-intensive manufactures, which further contributes to reducing
external constraints to long term economic growth. Later in time, as investments accelerate less,
the continuous improvement of the trade balance (Figure 1) in most GFR scenarios contributes to
sustaining higher economic activity compared to BAU by 2030.
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Led by increased investments and an improved trade bala ce, Brazil’s economy follows a new
cycle f GDP gr wth (Figure 1). Direct, indirect, and induced macroeconomic interactions and
feedbacks further accelerate GDP growth (up to 0.42%), boost investments (up to 1.16%), and improve
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the trade balance (up to 2.5%) by 2030. Briefly, when industries invest or export more, the output is
directly increased via an expansion of demand from relevant sectors (e.g., machinery and equipment
sectors). By increasing their output, these sectors demand additional inputs from their suppliers, which
in turn purchase more inputs from their suppliers and so on. In addition to these direct and indirect
impacts throughout the economic chain, as industries expand their output and expect higher demand
levels in the future, they invest in additional production capacity, which creates further demand for
capital goods. Higher income levels in the economy are reflected in additional spending, which also
causes the economy to expand. Lastly, increased domestic demand may be met by growing imports of
some products. As demand levels abroad grow, other countries may increase their imports from Brazil,
which can boost economic activity further.
The impact of GFR scenarios on employment is positive in the first instance but becomes negative
later on (Figure 1). As investments expand, they drive the expansion of economic activities, which
leads to net job creation relative to the baseline owing to macroeconomic interactions and feedbacks.
However, as investments continue to expand, ever increasing capital stocks start substituting for
labor. It is underlined that the magnitude of the impact is small, i.e., it represents up to 0.1% of
employment levels in the reference scenario. Notwithstanding, the substitution of labor by capital
could be avoided. Positive economic prospects provide the conditions for additional productive
inclusion or social compensation policies. GFRs were designed to reduce the cost of capital, but they
could also include fiscal incentives that reduce labor costs. GFRs present a positive fiscal impact on
the government’s budget over most of the period of analysis (Table 3). These outstanding resources
could be used to reduce tax costs on labor, such as social security contributions, instead of reducing the
budget deficit. Studies show that countries that recycle carbon tax revenues back to the economy by
reducing distorting labor taxes have achieved net job creation [76]. This possibility can be explored by
future studies in the context of Brazil.
Table 3. Summary of green fiscal reforms.
Scenarios Tax ExemptionRange (%)
Grants EUR2005
Million
Carbon Tax
EUR/tCO2
Government’s Primary
Deficit Relative BAU
% of GDP in 2030
EE 0.5%–11.3% 14,051 6.0 −0.06%
MR 4%–5% 57 0.3 0.00%
NG 0.5% 1855 0.7 −0.02%
RN 3%–11.3% 641 1.3 −0.04%
SB N/A 6999 N/A −0.02%
CO 1%–11.3% 11 0.1 −0.02%
EE+MR 0.5%–11.3% 14,309 6.3 −0.06%
EE+MR+NG 0.5%–11.3% 16,187 6.8 −0.06%
EE+MR+NG+RN 0.5%–11.3% 16,551 7.2 −0.07%
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB 0.5%–11.3% 23,916 7.2 −0.07%
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO 0.5%–11.3% 24,076 7.4 −0.08%
GFRs result in a positive impact on wages (Figure 1). The magnitude of the impact is larger in
scenarios that simulate more fiscal incentives for green investments, especially scenarios in which
joint implementation of mitigation technologies is being targeted. Wages increase by up to 0.5% (in
scenario EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO) in 2030 relative to the baseline. The increase in this variable is
engendered by growing labor productivity. As the Brazilian economy becomes more capital-intensive,
labor productivity expands as more output can be obtained by each worker. Increased productivity
leads to increased revenues per worker, which pushes wages and personal disposable income up (see
Supplementary Discussions and Figures for details). These variables show relevant socioeconomic
gains of GFRs, concerning an increased amount of money available for households to spend and save
after income taxes have been accounted for.
In addition, CO2 emissions are significantly reduced by the introduction of GFRs (by up to 14.5%;
Figure 1), compared to BAU, led by manufacturing sectors and, to a lesser extent, by other sectors,
which shows that GFRs can induce emissions mitigation throughout the economy (see Supplementary
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Discussions and Tables for details). These results substantiate that GFRs can contribute to reducing
Brazil’s external constraints to long-term economic growth while reducing CO2 emissions relative
to BAU.
4. Discussion
Scenarios that require a larger volume of low carbon investments are granted more green stimulus
to induce these, which in turn, also require a larger carbon tax to prevent a negative fiscal impact on
the government’s budget (Table 3). This is illustrated by scenarios that simulate joint implementation
of mitigation technologies. As more technologies are induced, more investments are required. For
example, the GFR simulated in scenario EE+MR+NG+RN includes 2.2% more grants in comparison to
scenario EE+MR+NG. As more fiscal incentives are granted, in scenario EE+MR+NG+RN, a higher
carbon tax (at EUR 7.2/tCO2) is required to avoid a negative fiscal impact on the government’s budget
in comparison to scenario EE+MR+NG (in which the carbon tax is EUR 6.8/tCO2).
The projected net impact of GFRs over 2018 to 2030 is a reduction in the government’s primary
deficit for most scenarios in relation to the baseline (Table 3), which account for the impact of reduced
tax revenues from reduced use of fossil fuels. In most scenarios, more fiscal incentives are granted
in 2018, such that the net fiscal impact in that year is negligible (i.e., it is less than 0.01% of GDP). In
2018 carbon tax revenues are spent virtually entirely on green fiscal incentives. As public spending
progressively reduces from 2019 (owing to decreasing tax exemptions and grants), the positive net
fiscal result allows the government to reduce its primary budget. As the carbon tax is fixed, GFRs more
than offset the fiscal impact of green incentives and reduce the government’s primary deficit.
Considering implemented mitigation technologies separately, energy efficiency technologies
present most gains in terms of GDP growth, trade balance improvement, and CO2 emissions abatement.
However, impacts are most prominent in scenarios that simulate joint implementation of mitigation
technologies and, therefore, create synergies. Most gains occur in the scenario that concerns the most
comprehensive GFR, EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO. In this scenario, the GFR can add the equivalent of
Malta’s or Macedonia’s GDP in 2018 to Brazil’s economy in 2030, compared to BAU. Over 2018 to 2030,
Brazil could avoid emitting in this scenario the entire volume of CO2 that the country would emit in
2030 in the absence of reforms.
In contrast, scenario SB does not deliver results as economically impactful as other scenarios. This
scenario focuses on investments in planted forests, which, being part of the primary sector, present
limited backward and forward linkages, spillover, and learning effects in the economic chain [64].
These investments lead to increased exports from the forestry sector, as they help forestry industries
become more competitive. However, as exports of medium and high-technology goods do not increase,
the net impact of these economic effects is an augmented dependence on primary exports, which
aggravates external restriction to long-term economic growth [65,66]. Although substantial CO2
emissions reductions can be obtained from this technology, SB does not help Brazil avoid carbon
lock-in, as fossil fuel consumption continues to increase over time. SB plays an important role in
reducing CO2 emissions, but in order to produce similar socioeconomic and environmental gains as
other scenarios, SB should ideally be implemented jointly with other mitigation technologies.
In the context of Brazil’s NDC (i.e., to reduce GHG emissions by 37% by 2025 and 43% by 2030
relative to 2005) [12], we underline that Brazil is on track to meet the bulk of its NDC target by
reducing deforestation and despite growing burning of fossil fuels [15]. However, as scenario SB
projections indicate, reducing deforestation alone may not bring important long-term benefits, such as
avoiding carbon lock-in and reducing external economic vulnerabilities. On the other hand, results
show that GFRs can contribute to meeting the target to different extents. Scenarios EE+MR+NG+RN,
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB, and EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO can contribute the most, as these exhibit absolute
net reductions in CO2 emissions by manufacturing sectors in 2030 relative to BAU emissions in 2018.
Net economy-wide absolute reductions in emissions, however, would require additional mitigation
measures and policies targeted at other sectors, particularly the transport sector, to effectively lead
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Brazil on to a low carbon development path compatible with the limits of the 2 ◦C [77] and 1.5 ◦C [3]
warming set in the Paris Agreement [1].
Finally, it is underlined that GFRs can be achieved at considerably low carbon tax rates (see
Table 3). A carbon tax rate of up to 7.4 EUR/tCO2 (less than 10 USD/tCO2) would be sufficient to finance
fiscal stimulus (tax exemptions and concessional finance) for all mitigation technologies (scenario
EE+MR+NG+RN+SB+CO). At this rate, the government would be able to support manufacturing
sectors with concessional grants worth EUR2005 24,076 million in total over 2018 to 2030 and tax
exemptions (up to 11.3 percentage points) to invest in low carbon technologies that achieve maximum
mitigation potential.
See Supplementary Discussions, Figures, and Tables for more information on results, including
sector-level details.
5. Conclusions
As part of global efforts, limiting global warming to well below 2 ◦C as set out in the Paris Agreement
requires developing countries to avoid the emission-intensive stages of development [1,2]. Similar
to other developing countries, Brazil is faced with the twin challenge of pursuing socioeconomic
development while reducing GHG emissions. The overarching question of this paper sought to
understand what realistic and credible mitigation measures and policies could be implemented
in Brazilian and also in other developing countries’ manufacturing sectors that both reduce GHG
emissions and enhance the country’s socioeconomic performance. The motivation for this question lies
partly in evidence produced that emissions-reducing technological change can overcome the scale
effect of rising income per capita on emissions in developing countries [78].
This does not mean that all mitigation policies and measures present net benefits but rather that
research should contribute to identifying the ones that do and the circumstances in which they can
produce net benefits, which may vary from country to country. This does not mean either that no
economic sectors will incur losses. Rather, it means mapping climate policies that produce more
benefits than losses in macroeconomic terms. More research is urgently needed to map climate policies
that produce more benefits than losses in macroeconomic terms and identify policies that are not in
conflict with socioeconomic development, particularly in developing countries.
We challenge the popular belief that mitigation policies generate net macroeconomic losses,
which feeds the misleading perception that the scenarios of inaction towards global warming
would be more economically efficient. Our projections show that a comprehensive GFR targeted
at greening manufacturing industries can deliver higher economy-wide GDP growth, which is also
qualitatively better, because it reduces CO2 emissions throughout the economy, increases investments,
and strengthens trade performance. Crucially, GFRs alleviate external constraints to long-term
economic development. The right mix of policies can lead Brazil (and possibly other developing
economies) on to a development route that is more sustainable both economically and environmentally.
For Brazil, a portfolio of green fiscal incentives can drive a new economic growth cycle led by low
carbon investments, which also produces structural transformations that alleviate external constraints
to long term economic growth while setting the country’s manufacturing sectors on a low carbon
technological route.
Scaling up green fiscal stimulus in manufacturing sectors globally needs to be considered as one
of the main policy measures helping with the transformation to a low-carbon economy, especially in
the developing world.
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